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The thesis argues that air power now dominates modern warfare. The overwhelming
victory of the Gulf War stands as a symbol of the maturity of air power. In effect,
technology has caught up with nearly a century of air power theory, the early prophets of
air power were basically correct. The air war in the Gulf was revolutionary in the sense
that very few bombs were required to achieve an enormous amount of very focused,
precise destruction. The existence of precision guided munitions allows single aircraft to
accomplish what, in the past, would have taken literally thousands of aircraft to
accomplish or could not have been accomplished at all. The argument is based on a
comparison of the employment of air power in previous conflicts. A comparison is then
made with the employment of air power in the Gulf War. In the context of modern war,
the implications of the air war in the Gulf have profound implications for every warfare
specialty. However this thesis only considers the implications of precision guided
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The overwhelming victory in the Gulf War stands as a
symbol of the maturity of Air Power; it has come of age. The
air war in the Gulf was revolutionary in the sense that very
few bombs were required to achieve an enormous amount of very
precise destruction. The existence of precision guided
weapons allowed single aircraft to accomplish what, in the
past, would have taken literally thousands of aircraft to
accomplish or could not have been accomplished at all. The
performance of precision guided munitions in the recent
conflict suggests the following thesis: the technological
advances have largely solved the problem of accuracy that
prevented bombing alone from playing the decisive role in the
past. Achieving precision accuracy and much improved target
acquisition suggests that Air Power now dominates much of
modern warfare.
Over the past 80 years the means to apply Air Power during
a conflict has been strategic bombing. Concentrations of
"strategic" bombers were originally considered the only way to
achieve the desired strategic results. The central theme of
this thesis is that this is no longer the case. Instead of
bludgeoning an opponent through indiscriminate carpet bombing,
we can now apply focused and discriminate force. Advanced
conventional weapons with precision guidance allow air power
to achieve strategic results quickly, effectively and
economically. But no advance in technology yields an edge in
vi
combat forever; responses will be found and effective
countermeasures developed. Therefore, the United States must
continue to develop and produce advanced conventional weapons
and the systems that support them.
Just when the threats we have understood for decades
appear to have diminished, the international security
environment has entered a new, less stable phase. The future
demands a comprehensive understanding of Air Power and its
uses. In this regard, let me make it clear that "Air Power"
is used in its most comprehensive sense. One thing is
certain, Air Power will play a leading role in our response to
future security challenges. It will in some circumstances be
the only application of military power and in others will be
the form on which successful surface and naval operations
depend. In essence, air power now dominates nearly every
military role and mission.
The thesis briefly reviews the employment of air power in
previous conflicts. The experiences of the past provide a
background for comparison with the Air War in the Gulf and
reveals how precision accuracy alters the way in which we view
air power. In particular it makes each and every tactical
aircraft a potential strategic asset and targets normally
reserved for strategic assets can now be destroyed by tactical
assets. The implications of this fact transcend many levels
of modern warfare, this thesis limits itself to exploring the
impact of this new technology upon naval air power.
vii
The primary advantage of precision guided munitions
(PGM's) is they can destroy a target with a minimum of
weapons . In essence they exploit the economy of force maxim
of warfare. The importance of this fact is very relevant to
naval air power. PGM's question the reasons why naval air
power is not considered an integral portion of any strategic
air campaign. Naval air power, both cruise missiles and naval
tactical aviation, can make an important contribution to any
future bombing campaign; in some cases it may be the only way
to get the 30b done.
Vlll
I . INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the history of Air Power has been
characterized by exaggerated claims. The stunning results of
the Gulf War indicate that modern Air Power may at last have
the capabilities claimed for so long. The performance of
precision guided munitions suggest the following thesis: the
technological advances have largely solved the problem of
accuracy that prevented bombing alone from playing the
decisive role in the recent past. The achievement of
precision accuracy and much improved target acquisition
suggests that Air Power now dominates much of modern warfare.
The overwhelming victory in the Gulf War stands as a
symbol of the maturity of Air Power; it has come of age. The
Air War in the Gulf was revolutionary in the sense that very
few bombs were required to achieve an enormous amount of very
focused, precise destruction. The existence of precision
guided weapons allowed single aircraft to accomplish what, in
the past, would have taken literally thousands of aircraft to
accomplish or could not have been accomplished at all.
Just when the threats we have understood for decades
appear to have diminished, the international security
environment has entered a less stable phase. The future
demands a comprehensive understanding of Air Power and its
uses. In that regard, let me make it clear that I use the
term "Air Power" in its most comprehensive sense. I submit
that air power will play a leading role in our response to
future security challenges. It will in some circumstances be
the only application of military power and in others it will
be the form on which successful surface and naval operations
depend. In essence, air power now dominates nearly every
military role and mission.
A. THESIS
The early prophets of air power--notably General Giulio
Douhet (1869-1930), General William Mitchell (1879-1936), and
Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard ( 1873-1956 ) --based their visions on
the very limited air power experience of World War I. Their
visionary reach exceeded their technological grasp by many
decades. As a result they seemed to promise quick, cheap
victories from the air. This was certainly true of General
Douhet, who insisted that achieving "command of the air" would
not only be necessary but also sufficient for victory. 1
The first conflict that saw the employment of air power on
a large scale, World War II, tempered the views of its
advocates. Shortcomings in both technology and combat
experience meant that victory in WWII came neither quickly nor
'This central theme is expressed in David Maclsaac,
"Voices From the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," in
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear
Age, ed . Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1986), pp. 624-647.
cheaply. The many assumptions and promises of the air power
prophets fell short. As a result many came to view air power
theory as a series of unrealized, and perhaps unreachable,
dreams. However, recent experience suggests that perhaps the
early air power prophets were basically correct.
General Douhet established a primary tenet of air power
that has remained constant over the years. He considered the
guiding principle of any bombing actions should be this:
the objective must be destroyed completely in one attack,
making further attack on the same target unnecessary .
-
This tenet was originally interpreted as the delivery of large
amounts of munitions against a target to ensure its
destruction. Many technological shortcomings, such as limited
carrying capacity, precision navigation equipment, and weapons
accuracy, existed in air power's early years that required
this solution.
Over the past 80 years the means to apply Air Power during
a conflict has been strategic bombing. Concentrations of
"strategic" bombers were originally considered the only way to
achieve the desired strategic results. The central theme of
this thesis is that this is no longer the case. Instead of
bludgeoning an opponent through indiscriminate carpet bombing,
we now can apply focused and discriminate force. Advanced
conventional weapons with precision guidance allow air power
-'Charles M. Westenhoff, Military Air Power: The CADRE
Digest of Air Power Opinions and Thoughts, (Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama: Airpower Research Institute, 1990), p. 50.
to achieve strategic results quickly, effectively and
economically. But no advance in technology yields an edge in
combat forever; responses will be found and effective
countermeasures developed. Therefore, the United States must
continue to develop advanced conventional weapons and the
systems that support them.
A brief review of air power history is in order to develop
this argument . The experiences from the past provide a
background for comparison with the Air War in the Gulf.
Precision accuracy has fundamentally altered the way we view
air power. In particular it makes each and every tactical
aircraft a potential strategic asset. Targets normally
reserved for strategic assets can now be destroyed by tactical
assets. The implications of this fact are profound and
transcend many levels of modern warfare. This thesis is
limited to exploring the impact of this new technology upon
naval air power. At the outset a few definitions are
required to provide a common frame of reference.
B. DEFINITIONS
1. Precision Guided Munitions
The term precision guided munitions applies to the
complete weapon system based on technologies such as sensors,
munitions, advanced information systems, target acquisition
systems, communications systems, and missile defense. For
this purpose it will refer to extended-range cruise missiles
and guided munitions of great precision, discrimination, and




While improved accuracy is required to fulfill the
definition of an advanced conventional weapon, there also must
be sufficient destructive capability in the warhead to ensure
a high probability of kill. This is accomplished through





The term strategic conflict is defined by its scope.
Carl Builder suggests that the most helpful definition for
strategic conflict comes from Webster ' s dictionary in which it
is warfare designed "to strike at an enemy at the sources of
his military, economic or political power."' the thrust of the
overall war effort.
Circular Error Probable (CEP) - the radius of the circle
around the intended target within which there is a 50 percent
probability that a weapon aimed at the target would land
within
.
4 for a more detailed description on precision guided
munitions and the basics of their operation, I suggest the
following publication: R. J. Heaston and C. W. Smoots,
Introduction to Precision Guided Munitions , GACIAC HB-83-01
Vol 1, (Chicacgo, Illinois: Guidance and Control Information
Analysis Center, 1983).
"'Webster's New Collegiate dictionary, (Springfield,
Massachusetts: Merriam, 1981), 1141, in Carl Builder, "The
Prospects and Implications of Non-nuclear Means for Strategic
conflict," Adelphi Paper 200, (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), p. 2.
3 . Center of Gravity
The term center of gravity is useful in planning any
operations during a conflict. Clausewitz considered the
center of gravity to be the "hub of all power and movement."
It describes that point where the enemy is most vulnerable
and point where the attack has the best chance of being
decisive or a specific point where a level of effort can
accomplish more than that same level of effort could
accomplish if applied elsewhere.''
C. SUMMARY
The issue is whether we have entered a new era in which
bombing can determine who will win the war. Today after 80
years of experience extending across the spectrum of conflict
and some stunning technological developments air power
dominates modern warfare. If so, modern technology may have
caught up with nearly a century of air power theory with
profound implications for the future of warfare.
Current technologies allow for the production of highly
accurate and relatively inexpensive extended range weapons.
The difficulty is that in the current era of fiscal
constraints our political leaders may decide otherwise. The
bThe term "center of gravity" is drawn from John A.
Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, (Washington
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), pp 9-11.
implication is that new technologies are not likely to be
vigorously pursued because of budgetary concerns
.
However, decision makers inclined to reduce or eliminate
financial support for sophisticated advanced conventional
munitions systems and technology should first appreciate the
following
:
1. Surface forces have great difficulty operating in the
face of strong, hostile air power.
2. In what has been called the low intensity conflict
environment, air power provides advantages for surface
forces engaged in guerrilla tactics. Specifically these




Modern navies have capitalized heavily on the strength of
naval air power with the aircraft carrier and the new role
of surface ships armed with cruise missiles. In a
conventional war, only air power can be rapidly applied
simultaneously to every type of target, whether strategic,
operational or tactical.
The existence of advanced conventional weapons underscores
these points. In truth, we are only beginning to understand
how air power with advanced conventional weapons affects
modern warfare. None of this should be taken to deny the
importance of surface and naval forces for whom many tasks
remain. Air power cannot occupy territory or maintain a
continuous forward presence without a base in close proximity.
However, air power does possess tremendous leverage that
creates conditions for our forces to fight by denying the
enemy not just battle and campaign choices, but whole
strategies
.
II. A LOOK AT THE PAST
A sense of history is an essential element in the
strategic thought for several reasons. First it prevents one
from viewing war in isolation and demonstrates the
relationship between war and those political, economic, social
and intellectual considerations that permit war. Second,
history strengthens critical judgment with its wealth of
empirical evidence. In particular, the historical context of
air power's role in the spectrum of combat is necessary to
provide a contrast with the recent employment of air power in
the Gulf War and highlights the amazing impact of precision
guided munitions.
This chapter illustrates the nature of air power prior to
precision guided weapons. There are numerous books and
articles on the effectiveness of past strategies designed to
apply air power during a conflict; no attempt to argue this
point is made here. Instead, the historical problem of
translating strategy into employment and their associated
weapon systems will be investigated. Of particular
importance, the introduction of precision guided munitions in
Vietnam heralded their impact in the Gulf War. The linkage
between strategy and weapons is of prime importance in this
thesis
.
A. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The doctrine for strategic air attack was already firmly-
established before World War II. During the period between
1920 and 1941, U.S. military planners formulated a doctrine
based on the premise that neutralization of an enemy's
industrial base would destroy the will and means of the enemy
to wage war.
The Army Air Corps Tactical School was the focal point for
the development of strategic bombardment doctrine during the
period. Originally, the school was founded in 1920 with the
title of Air Service Field Officer's School. After a change
in name, a move, and a change in scope, it became the Air
Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama in 1931. Some
of the first students at the school were Ira C. Eaker, Carl
Spaatz, Curtis Lemay, Haywood Hansell and Claire E. Chennault.
These men would become central figures in the development and
employment of air power in war.
The school went through many steps in the development of
a doctrine to employ air power. The initial work was heavily
influenced by the experience of World War I and by a very
outspoken advocate of air power, General "Billy" Mitchell. By
1930, the school's central theory, known as the strategic
bombardment doctrine, included a premise that was to last
throughout World War II. Specifically the premise was that
bomber formations could concentrate enough firepower on a
given target to overcome the limitation in accuracy of early
aircraft and provide sufficient self-defense against hostile
aircraft .
The theory of strategic bombardment developed during the
1930's included the following: 7
1. Accurate strategic bombing favored daylight operations.
Daylight would improve bombing accuracy because it would
allow large aircraft formations and would reduce the
navigation problem.
2. Attacks should be from high altitude. Low altitude
treetop-level bombing was considered as a means to reduce




Attacks should be against the national economic structure







-sources of raw materials 8
The strategic bombardment doctrine did not require the
complete destruction of the above targets. The official
statements from the tactical school on the objectives of any
strategic bombing campaign clarify the point:
It must be remembered that disorganization ... rather than
complete destruction is the ultimate aim of the Air
7Haywood S. Hansel 1, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated
Hitler
,
(Atlanta, Georgia: Higgins-McArthur , 1972), pp. 41-
48.
^Bombardment Text, Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell
Field, Alabama, 1935, pp. 49-76.
10
Force .. .disorganization is the aim because it is more
economical and is equally effective."
The tactical school also developed a probability concept
to determine how many bombs would be required to destroy the
target sets. The results of peacetime bombing competitions
were used to determine an appropriate force composition to
achieve a 90 percent probability of destruction. The use of
the concept had obvious limitations. The biggest assumption
was that the accuracy achieved in peacetime exercises could be
maintained in a combat environment. It was not until the
experience of actual combat was this assumption altered, but
the concept set the stage for the use of mathematical
techniques to calculate a target's probability of destruction;
these techniques made the importance of accuracy dramatically
clear
.
B. WORLD WAR II
In July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed
concern that the quantity of available weapons might be
inadequate to execute our doctrine in wartime. He directed
Secretary of War Henry Stimson to determine the overall
production requirements needed to defeat our potential
'The Air Force, Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field,
Alabama, 1932-1933, p. 7.
11
enemies. 10 The War Department utilized the experience
located in the Air Corps Tactical School to develop an
employment doctrine for Air Power in a war. The doctrine was
articulated in the Air War Plans Division (AWPD) document,
which became known as AWDP-1.
Developing the doctrine was a massive undertaking for the
drafters of AWDP-1. The drafters of the document made some
basic assumptions on the accuracy of the weapons, the number
of weapons required to destroy a given target and an estimate
of aircraft loss rates. These assumptions were gleaned from
the limited American combat experience in the application of
air power in World War I . However, the more recent combat
experience of our Allies did influence the creation of AWDP-1.
The following are the results of this early plan designed to
guide the application of air power in the upcoming war:
1. The planners used July 1943 as the time period for the
start of operations. A final all out attack was scheduled
for some time between April and September of 1944.
2
.
The targets included 154 separate types that included
electric power systems, transportation sites, petroleum
sites, aircraft assembly plants and many others. An
interesting note is that electrical power sites were
considered the primary target.
3. The drafters established a requirement of 220 100 pound
bombs to destroy a 100 square-foot target.
4. A heavy bombardment group consisted of 70 aircraft. The
recent combat experience of the Royal Air Force suggested
that bombing errors in combat conditions were 2.25 times
^'Russell F. Wrigley, The American Way of War: A History
of United States Military Strategy and Policy
,
(Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 333-336.
12
greater than peacetime bombing. The limitation in accuracy
meant 3 bomber groups were necessary to destroy a target.
The equation was applied to all targets using only eight
suitable weather days per month for daylight visual bombing
in a six-month period. As a result the Air Doctrine
calculated that 6,860 bombers were necessary for the bombing
effort ."
The drafters of AWDP-1 were convinced of the merits of air
power. They enthusiastically stated that if the air offensive
was successful, a land invasion might not be necessary. 1 -'
The implicit hope for air power was that it offered a
revolutionary way of winning the war. The bold air plan was
submitted to Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall
who quickly approved and forwarded the document to the
President
.
In late 1942, based on actual combat experience, the AWDP-
1 was updated. The new document was the AWDP-42 and was
similar to the previous plan. Air power still was the key to
operations against Germany. It called for a conclusive
strategic offensive against the Axis powers and for a
strategic defensive against Japan in the Far East . AWDP-42
differed from its predecessor in two ways. It combined Army
Air Force (AAF) and Royal Air Force (RAF) operations into a
single offensive strategy and broadened the target set. The
nAir War Plans Division-1, Munitions Requirements of the
Army Air Forces (12 August 1941), Part 2, tab 1, 2, 2b.
(Hereafter referred to as AWPD-1.)
12 AWDP-1, part 2, tab 1, p. 2.
13
document defined the different missions of the AAF and the RAF
as :
The U.S. Army Air Force will concentrate its efforts upon
systematic destruction of selected vital elements of the
German military and industrial machine through precision
bombing in daylight. The R.A.F. will concentrate upon
mass air attacks of industrial areas at night, to break
down morale. 13
The target list specified in the AWPD-42 placed more
emphasis upon the destruction of the German U-boat threat and
the Luftwaffe. The targets in priority order included pursuit
airplane assembly plants, bomber airplane assembly plants,
aeroengine plants, submarine yards, transportation sites, and
power generating sites. 14
The new target set forced a revision of the force
structure required to ensure destruction. AWPD-42 established
a requirement for 2,965 bombers and, in contrast to AWPD-1,
called for a fighter escort. The planners used a bombing
accuracy of 1,000 feet for circular error probable (CEP) to
calculate the force requirements. The planners felt that for
the 177 identified targets 136,500 tons of bombs would be
delivered on 66,045 sorties by the 2,965 bombers. 1 "' The
biggest assumption made by the AWPD-42 was that the force
nAir War Plans Division-42, Requirements for Air
Ascendancy (9 September 1942), Part IV, p. 2. (Hereafter






requirement could be maintained regardless of the rate of
attrition
.
In November 1942 the Casablanca Conference changed the
Allied plan for strategic bombing. The overall goal of the
air offensive became the progressive destruction and
dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic
system and the undermining of the morale of the German people
to a point where their capacity for armed resistance was
fatally weakened. 10
The Casablanca Conference also changed the priority of the
targets for the air offensive, they were directed in order of
priority
:
1. German submarine construction yards





5. Other targets in the enemy war industry 17
However, the Casablanca agreements on target priority were not
the final determination of what targets, how many aircraft and
what accuracy of weapons should be used in planning for the
strategic bombing offensive.
l0Russell F. Wrigley, The American Way of War: A History
of United States Military Strategy and Policy
, p. 338.
17Thomas A. Fabyanic, Strategic Air Attack in the United
States Air Force: A Case Study
,
(Manhattan, Kansas: Military
Affairs/Aerospace Historian Publishing, 1976), p. 75.
15
Instead, a committee of operational analysts made a study
of the German economy and, using the political guidance of the
Casablanca Conference, made a target list recommendation. 13
The list was combined with the AWDP-42 and the final target
list was made for the combined bomber offensive. The analysts
and planners identified targets were considered the "key vital
centers" of the German War effort, these targets were, in
order of priority:
1. Intermediate Objective: German fighter strength
2. Primary Objectives: German submarine yards and bases,
the remainder of the German aircraft industry, ball bearing
plants, oil production sites
3. Secondary Objectives: synthetic rubber and tire
production sites and military motor transport
vehicles 1Q
The target list contained 76 actual targets and required
a force of 2,702 bombers. 20 The importance of this new
target set was that its objective was air supremacy. The goal
of air supremacy marked a major modification to air power
doctrine. The strategists did not accept Douhet ' s idea
that a contest for air supremacy was not necessary. Jl Actual
combat experiences identified the nature of the problem. The
laIbid, p. 7;
^Wrigley, The American Way of War: A History of United
States Military Strategy and Policy, p. 337.
-'°Fabyanic, Strategic Air Attack in the United States Air
Force: A Case Study, p. 80.
j:Wrigley, The American Way of War: A History of United
States Military Strategy and Policy, p. 334.
16
effectiveness of the German Air Defense indicated that the
bomber would not always get through. Long-range fighters were
necessary to counter the threat of German fighters. The
result was planners recognized the need for rival fighters to
struggle for command of the air.
The significance of the strategic bombing attacks on the
German industrial base is reflected by Albert Speer's comments
thirty years later:
I shall never forget the date May 12 [1944] . . .On that day
the technological war was decided. Until then we had
managed to produce approximately as many weapons as the
armed forces needed, in spite of their considerable
[equipment and personnel] losses. But with the attack of
nine hundred and thirty-five daylight bombers of the
American Eighth Air Force upon several fuel plants in




German industrial production could no longer fully support the
war effort. The air offensive had made a difference.
The lessons of the strategic bombing campaign against
Germany are reflected in the report by the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) . The report made these
general observations:
full scale strategic bombing directed at the heartland of
any major power, even one as rugged and resilient as
Germany's, could be decisive .. .Regardless of the forces
actually applied, the USSBS concluded that persistent re-
attack of all targets was necessary since no target system
had been put out of commission by a single attack. -
"Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich
,
(New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 346.
JiFabyanic, Strategic Air Attack in the United States Air
Force: A Case Study, p. 95.
17
The technology available during World War II created the
requirement to re-attack targets; the fundamental limitation
was the lack of precision accuracy.
C. THE STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN
The initial phases of the war against Japan were purely
defensive. The Allies agreed to make the defeat of Germany
the primary objective of the overall war effort. By the time
the war in the Pacific shifted to an offensive one, the
doctrine of strategic bombing and its associated weapon
systems incorporated several refinements.
The U.S. strategic air war in Europe was fought primarily
with the B-17, whereas the strategic war against Japan used
the more modern and capable B-2 9. The USSBS provides other
comparisons between the European and Pacific strategic air
campaigns
.
The physical destruction resulting from the air attack on
Japan approximates that suffered by Germany, even though
the tonnage of bombs dropped was far smaller. The attack
was more concentrated in time, and the target areas were
smaller and more vulnerable. Not only were the Japanese
defenses overwhelmed, dispersal and passive defenses were
less than Germany's. In the aggregate some 40 percent of
the built-up area of the 66 cities attacked was destroyed.
Approximately 30 percent of the active urban population of
Japan lost their home and many of their possessions. The
physical destruction of industrial plants subjected to
high-explosive attacks was similarly impressive. The
larger bomb loads of the B-29 permitted higher density
bombs per acre in the plant area, and on the average,
18
somewhat heavier bombs were used. The destruction was
generally more complete than in Germany.^ 4
The targets struck by the B-29's in Japan were similar to
those in Europe. The Joint Targeting Group in Washington
suggested the rationale behind the selection of targets. It
states that
:
there were no strategic bottlenecks in the Japanese
industrial and economic system except aircraft engine
plants, but . . . the enemy's industry as a whole was
vulnerable through incendiary attacks on the principal
urban areas.'15
The priority targets were engine manufacturing plants,
followed by four aircraft component and assembly plants. Port
and urban industrial areas were designated as secondary
targets
.
The Allies planned for a strategic air attack to reduce
the will of the Japanese. The incendiary raids on Japan were
specifically designed to accomplish this objective. The
civilian deaths attributed to the incendiary raids proved
staggering. The bombing survey reported that:
[civilian deaths] exceeded the number of strictly military
deaths inflicted on the Japanese in combat by armed forces
of the U.S. ... more persons were killed in one 6-hour
period by the least expenditure of bombs than in any other
recorded attack of any kind. 2b
~ 4The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific
War), Report no. 1, p. 17. (Hereafter referred to as USSBS.)
jrWesley Craven and James Cate, eds
.
, The Air Force in
World War II
,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953),
vol. V. p. 624.
J
'USSBS (Pacific War), Report no. 90. p. 2.
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In March, 1945, the most destructive conventional air raid
in history was conducted against Tokyo. In loss of life, it
killed 83,793 people, injured 40,918, destroyed a quarter of
Tokyo's buildings, and left more than a million people
homeless. j7 The Allies wanted to bring Japan to surrender
without having to resort to a invasion, the objective was to
end the war quickly and keep their casualties to a minimum.
It is interesting to note that the casualties of this
conventional attack compare in magnitude to either the
casualties from the use of atomic weapons at either Hiroshima
or Nagasaki. In retrospect, the use of atomic weapons was the
logical next step in the strategic bombing offensive.
D. WORLD WAR II WEAPON SYSTEMS
A brief description of the aircraft employed in the
strategic bombing campaigns of World War II is a requirement
for the reader to understand two important points. The first
is the dramatic improvements that have occurred through
numerous technological advances made over Air Power's history.
The other point is Airmen have continually looked for
innovations to improve accuracy. The implication is that the
technology resident in today's advanced conventional weapons




The main weapon system for the U.S. bombing offensive
against Germany was the B-17 Flying Fortress. The initial
models of the aircraft did not have enough defensive of
armament to be a true "Flying Fortress." By the end of 1941,
numerous improvements were incorporated into the B-17G. The
improved model had a top speed of 300 mph at 30,000 feet, an
armament of 13 .50-caliber machine guns and could carry up to
17,600 pounds of gravity bombs for short ranges or 4,000
pounds for long ranges. The B-17G was superior to the best
British and German bombers of the time. 28
A clear example of wartime experience, strategy, and
operational requirements leading to a weapon system is the
development of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress. The design of
this aircraft reflects the doctrine of strategic bombing by
high-altitude heavily armed bombers. The armament of the B-2 9
included four remote-controlled turrets each containing two
.50-caliber machine guns and a direct-controlled tail turret
containing two .50-caliber machine guns and a 2 0mm cannon.
The major improvement over the B-17 was that the B-2 9 could
carry a larger payload to a greater distance. The aircraft
could carry up to 16,000 pounds of bombs to a maximum range of
5,830 miles. 29
28John Kirk and Rober Young, Jr., Great Weapons of World
War II , (New York: Walker and Company, 1961), pp. 72-75.
29Ibid, pp. 122-135
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During the course of the war the incorporation of a
technological innovation suggests U.S. airmen actively desired
a way to increase the accuracy of the existing systems. In
the Pacific theater, improvements in radar allowed strategic
precision bombing to be conducted at night or in all-weather
conditions. General LeMay made the following observation
after reviewing the results of a radar directed mission:
I have just reviewed the post-strike photography of your
strike on target 17 64, the Maruzen Oil Refinery at
Shimotsu, the night of 6/7 July. With a half -wing effort
you achieved ninety-five percent destruction, definitely
establishing the ability of your crews with the APQ-7 [the
radar] to hit and destroy precision targets, operating
individually at night. The performance is the most
successful radar bombing of the command to date. 30
During the European strategic bombing offensive, daylight
precision bombing required clear weather and good visibility
for the Norden optical bombsight to work. The introduction of
radar on. the B-29 provided the means to give the Allies a more
precise strategic bomber.
The search was definitely on to increase bombing accuracy.
The results did not achieve anything close to near zero CEP.
However, before the development of precision guided munitions
another answer became available. Instead of destroying a
target with a direct impact, the ability to deliver an
enormous destructive blast on a target presented itself.
30Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Strategic Air War Against
Japan
,
(Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Airpower Research Institute,
1980), p. 63.
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E. THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are
perhaps the most publicized of the strategic bombing attacks
of the war. The weapons marked a revolutionary increase in
the destructive potential of air power. From a strategy to
weapon standpoint, they were a logical development in the
doctrine of strategic bombing. However kind or unkind history-
is to the first and only use of nuclear weapons, they do mark
a long period of stagnation in the evolution of U.S. strategic
thought on air power.
The issue of whether the use of atomic weapons induced the
Japanese to surrender is a widely debated topic. The
conclusions of the USSBS indicate the nature of the issue:
From the standpoint of the politics of surrender--and by
August 1945 politics was the key--the atom bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not essential. From its
studies of Japanese resources, military position, and
ruling class politics, the survey estimates that the
government would have surrendered prior to 1 November and
certainly before the end of the year, whether or not the
atomic bombs had been dropped and Russia had entered the
war. In the 10 to 15 weeks between the actual and
probable surrender date, the air attack from the Marianas,
augmented by the Okinawa-based forces, would have reached
a new high. Furthermore, morale probably would have
continued its already steep decline to complete
demoralization. The atom bombs hastened surrender, but
did not themselves provide the major motive. 31
Clearly, the use of atomic weapons provided the Japanese an
added incentive to surrender, they were not the sole reason.
Nuclear weapons may not have been instrumental during World
31USSBS (Pacific War), Report no. 14, p. 4
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War II, but they did play a major role in shaping the post-war
international environment.
Strategic bombing, the contemporary embodiment of air
power, could now cripple a country's war effort with either
conventional or nuclear weapons. As long as the U.S. held a
monopoly on atomic weapons it enjoyed a remarkable advantage.
However, the U.S. lost this luxury once the Soviet Union
attained a nuclear capability. Air power now had two faces,
a nuclear one and a conventional one. The juxtaposition of
the two created a period of stagnation in air power thought
and doctrine as its advocates struggled to deal with the
enormous destructive qualities of atomic weapons.
The theme of U.S. strategic bombing during World War II
had been to limit civilian casualties whenever possible. The
introduction of atomic bombs eliminated the distinction
between military and civilian targets. Nuclear weapons were
simply too powerful for pinpoint attacks. Collateral damage
to civilians would unavoidably occur in any strategic bombing
campaign using nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons created a
dilemma for U.S. air power advocates.
The incorporation of atomic weapons into Air Power created
a deterrent strategy that prevails even today. This thesis
affected the proper employment of air power in the two major
conflicts of the Cold War. The threat of a larger conflict or
a nuclear exchange affected the employment of air power in
both Korea and Vietnam.
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F. THE KOREAN WAR
The results of Air Power against North Korea are somewhat
confusing but in the aggregate can be considered successful.
The strategic bombing campaign in Korea began in August of
1950 but only lasted eight weeks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
determined:
that destruction of such targets of relatively long-term
military significance was no longer considered necessary.
Hence forward, all air operations were to be directed
against' objectives which had an immediate bearing upon the
tactical situation in Korea. 32
Strategic air operations were terminated on 27 September 1950
and for the remainder of the war air power was employed to
interdict the North Korean military.
Originally, military planners compiled a priority listing
of strategic targets. The targets were assigned by area
rather than a specific target set. Most of the targets were
close together and required only a minimum number of missions.
The plan called for incendiary raids against the target areas
followed by demolition bombs in precision attacks against
industrial plants. 33 The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the
plan, but
Washington was very hesitant about any air action which
might be exploited by Communist propaganda and desired no
32Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in
Korea 1950-1953




unnecessary civilian casualties which might result from
fire raids. 34
The threat of escalation to a larger scale conflict prompted
the U.S. political leadership to restrict the use of air power
in Korea.
The initial attacks were heavy and targets were hit until
destroyed. B-29's from the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) faced
little opposition as they bombed North Korean transportation
and industrial centers. The bulk of target selection was
given to the FEAF's Target Committee which was the "basic
theater agency for target selection." 35 The Target Committee
focused first on the North Korean industry and directed
attacks against the North Korean facilities in Hungnam,
Wonsan, Pyongyang, and Konan. However, North Korea's major
hydroelectric power plants along the Yalu river were
deliberately not targeted. 36
In the end, U.S. strategic bombing in Korea followed post-
World War II conventional bombing doctrine closely. One point
became evident, strategic bombers could use conventional
weapons to interdict an opponents military infrastructure.
However, the use of air power in the Korean conflict was not
34 Ibid, pp. 178-179
35From excerpts of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) Report
on the Korean War, 25 June 1950-27 July 1953, Vol. II in R. F.




considered its primary role. Instead, the emphasis remained
on the potential for a nuclear conflict. The importance of
this is that consequently little effort was placed on
improving conventional capabilities.
G. THE SECOND USE OF AIR POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
The Vietnam conflict (1965-1973) in Southeast Asia was the
second large scale U.S. employment of air power in the nuclear
age. The strategic bombing campaign in Korea came at the
start of hostilities while in Vietnam it came at the end,
after a long intermittent aerial interdiction campaign. In
Vietnam military doctrine was subordinated to a policy of
"coercive bargaining, " where force and the threat of greater
force were used as forms Of political pressure as signals of
intent, Rolling Thunder provides an example. Political
leaders .constrained the effective use of air power in both
Vietnam and Korea. 37
The effectiveness of air power in Vietnam must be viewed
in the light of the self-imposed restrictions on its
employment. The restrictions were designed to prevent direct
Soviet or Chinese intervention that could have turned the
limited war into a direct confrontation between superpowers.
37The basic ideas for this section are heavily influenced
by Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American
Bombing of North Vietnam, (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1989)
.
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The net result was to dilute the potency of the air campaign,
turning it into a war of attrition against the North
Vietnamese.
During the war, the U.S. conducted two distinct bombing
campaigns, Rolling Thunder and Linebacker. In both, the B-52
was the primary aircraft used to deliver large quantities of
ordnance. The primary role of the B-52 was not strategic but
rather interdiction.
1 . Ro1 1ing Thunder
President Johnson's approval for air strikes against
Vietnam in February 1965 began the first attempt to employ air
power in Vietnam for a strategic effect. On 24 February,
Operation Rolling Thunder, a major interdiction campaign
characterized by gradually increasing the use of force, began
a nearly four year run.
The ominous name came as cells of B-52 bombers carpet
bombed acres of terrain in an effort to knock out supply
caches and suspected locations of North Vietnamese troops.
Secretary of Defense McNamara provided the rationale for the
use of B-52s against these targets:
We are faced with very, very heavy jungle in certain
portions of South Vietnam, jungle so heavy that it is
impossible to find an aiming point in it . We know some of
these jungles are .used by the Viet Cong for base camps and
for storage areas... you can imagine that without an
ability to find an aiming point, there is only one way of
bombing it and that is with a random pattern. . .and I
believe this was a proper use of the weapons [and] that
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these strikes would destroy certain of the Viet Cong based
areas ... there is no other way of doing it. 38
Initially, the Rolling Thunder campaign was limited to
targets south of the 20th parallel. The target selection
process was much different from that used in either World War
II or Korea. No longer did the senior staff debate the
priorities of strategic targets. Instead,
Washington still had reservations and placed severe
controls on B-52 employment. One such control called for
approval in Washington, sometimes at the White House
level, of all proposed targets. 39
Only targets on a list prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President
could be hit. Additionally, the bombers were restricted from
attacking ports and industrial plants. 40 The acceptable
target lists did not allow air commanders any leeway. In
effect the constraints removed one of air power's greatest
advantages, its flexibility.
In the middle of March, 1965, Washington loosened the
restrictions. The approval was given for strikes into North
Vietnam itself, but the control over the lists of permissible
targets remained in Washington. Additionally, special
restrictions prevented air commanders from attacking any
38Carl Berger, ed., USAF is Southeast Asia, (Washington
D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1977), p. 149.
39Ibid, pp. 149-150.
40Lon O. Nordeen, Jr., Air Warfare in the Missile Age,
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985), p.
11.
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target within 30 miles of Hanoi, within 10 miles of Haiphong
or within 3 miles of China. Throughout the air campaign the
president not only determined where and what his pilots could
attack but also how often they could do so. 41
Even with the targeting constraints, the effectiveness
of the B-52 during rolling thunder was demonstrated on several
occasions. General William C. Westmoreland provides one such
example when several months after the battle of Khe Sanh he
observed,
the thing that broke their back basically was the fire of
the B-52s...the heavyweight of firepower, was the
tremendous tonnage of bombs dropped by our B-52s. 42
The air campaign did affect the outcome of tactical
situations, but on the strategic level it was a failure.
Vietnam is a country whose greatest resources are its
people and their food supply. The difficulty for Rolling
Thunder is that it did not attack the correct types of targets
effectively. For the typical North Vietnamese, Rolling
Thunder was more a nuisance than a danger. Few consumer goods
other than food arrived in the North, and throughout the air
campaign the average daily intake of calories fell from 1,910
in 1963 to 1,880 in 1967. 43 Although Rolling Thunder
affected the North Vietnamese, they quickly responded with a
41Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower, pp. 118-124
42Carl Berger, ed., USAF in Southeast Asia, p. 15 0.
43Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower, p. 137.
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stoic determination. Additionally, after a short period of
time the North Vietnamese knew that President Johnson would
not allow the use of unrestricted air power against their
country.
Rolling Thunder gradually grew more severe, reflecting
the movement of the debate among the president's advisors over
the value of bombing North Vietnam. By the end of 1967, most
of North Vietnam's major electric power and industrial targets
were bombed. U.S. aircraft routinely fought their way into
and back out of North Vietnam's airspace. North Vietnam's
government, in response, dispersed its petroleum supplies and
constructed more air raid shelters. 44 The response to the
air campaign enabled North Vietnam to tolerate the damage from
Rolling Thunder.
President Johnson announced on March 31, 1968 that the
United States would cease all bombing north of the 2 0th
parallel. Several factors influenced the president to make
this decision; the increasing numbers of U.S. casualties to an
increasingly effective North Vietnamese air defense network,
the Tet offensive and political turmoil in the United States.
The essential fact is that Rolling Thunder ended without




On 3 March 1972, regular units of North Vietnam's
army attacked across the declared demilitarized zone. In
response, President Nixon ordered the Joint Chiefs to make
preparations for air strikes into North Vietnam. The most
crucial task of U.S. air power was to slow the North
Vietnamese invasion.
Once enough assets were available, aircraft began to
interdict supply and transportation networks. A crucial
difference distinguishes Linebacker from Rolling Thunder.
Washington relaxed its controls over the conduct of
operations, most of the targets on the original Joint Chiefs
target list were released, and commanders had the freedom to
choose when, where, and how frequently to attack a target. 45
The authority to strike almost any valid military target was
in sharp contrast to the extensive restrictions in existence
during Rolling Thunder.
Linebacker lasted from April through December of 1972 .
On 16 April, B-52s and other aircraft bombed the oil storage
facilities near Haiphong and on 8 May, Navy aircraft mined and
closed the port of Haiphong. By the end of May, most of the
crucial rail lines linking China to Hanoi and Haiphong had
45Ibid, p. 164.
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been cut. North Vietnam's imports of material were cut to
less than one fifth of what they were before Linebacker. 46
Linebacker I achieved in its first four months of
operation what Rolling Thunder had been unable to do in three
and a half years. B-52s participating in Linebacker
conducting both strategic and interdiction missions, but
assessing their impact is beyond the scope of this paper.
However we shall review another key element contributing to
the campaign's success, the use of tactical aircraft with
precision guided munitions.
The Air Force and Navy successfully employed two newly
developed precision guided weapon systems, laser-guided bombs
(called Paveway) and an electro-optically guided glide bomb
(called Walleye) . The type of target being attacked
determined the type of weapon used against it. Against area
targets such as railroad yards and storage facilities, where
the risk of civilian casualties was minimal, conventional
bombs were used. Using laser or electro-optical guidance
technology developed after Rolling Thunder, the new precision
weapons could hit targets in populated areas with remarkable
accuracy and minimize collateral damage.
46J. Morrocco, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969-1973,
(Boston: Boston Publishing Co., 1985), pp. 131-133.
33
The most widely used precision-guided weapon was the
Paveway family of laser guided bombs. On 10 May, 1972 32 F-4s
attacked Hanoi's Paul Doumer Bridge, located close to Hanoi.
The bridge was within sight of Gia Lam airfield, its loss
would disrupt rail and vehicular traffic in the area,
demonstrate the accuracy of the new weapons, and have a
psychological effect on the North Vietnamese. Pilots dropped
2 9 LGBs and heavily damaged the bridge. 47 Air Force Major
General Eugene L. Hudson, 7th Air Force Director of
Intelligence, asserted that "laser-guided bombs...
revolutionalized tactical bombing." 48 However, his comments
can be expanded, the true importance of precision guided
weapons was that they allowed tactical aircraft to participate
in a strategic bombing campaign.
H. SUMMARY
In this brief examination of air power in past conflicts,
it is obvious that its employment did not achieve its
potential. However, the history of air power has gradually
matured over the past 80 years, and its potency has increased
with time. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons dominated our view
of military strategy during the past 40 years.
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47Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower, pp. 158-159.
48Quoted in Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower, p
34
Strategic warfare became synonymous with nuclear warfare,
resulting in the neglect of thought about the strategic
employment of non-nuclear air power. However, this has not
changed the necessity to determine our strategy and to build
weapon systems capable of responding to all levels of
conflict
.
The nuclear weapon should not substitute for the
development of a viable conventional strategy in today's
environment. The lessons of World War II and the constraints
of Korea and Vietnam serve as the basis for a new approach to
the employment of air power in a conventional conflict. The
final stages of the air campaign in Vietnam heralded the
increasing capabilities of air power to dominate the
battlefield. Clearly precision guided munitions play a key
role in the proper employment of air power in modern warfare.
The following chapter examines the employment of air power in
the Gulf War, the first conflict with widespread use of
precision guided munitions.
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III. A SYMBOL OF MATURITY
The air campaign in the Gulf War is the application of Air
Power in its purest sense. It is revolutionary in the sense
that a few number of bombs achieved an enormous amount of
focused, precise destruction. Desert Storm was the first war
in which single airplanes were able to fly through to their
targets and accomplish what in the past, either could not have
been accomplished at all or would have taken literally
thousands of airplanes to accomplish. The issue for modern
strategists is whether we have entered an era in which bombing
alone can create the conditions for victory. If so, modern
technology may have finally caught up with nearly a century of
theory with profound implications for the future of warfare.
A. THE REAL AND SYMBOLIC VICTORY
The story of what happened in the air during Desert Storm
is well known. Beginning in mid-January 1991, coalition air
power seized control of the air over both Kuwait and Iraq
within a few hours. Air supremacy was evident within a matter
of days. In nearly simultaneous actions, air power blinded
and deafened the Iraqi leadership, making command and control
of Iraqi forces in the field exceedingly difficult. The air
campaign attacked and destroyed strategic targets, such as
power plants or nuclear facilities, and tactical targets. The
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tactical phase was a classic interdiction campaign designed to
physically isolate Iraqi surface forces deployed in and around
Kuwait. The interesting point of the campaign is that
although Desert Storm was conceived as a four-phased campaign,
all phases overlapped to the point that they were nearly
simultaneous
.
The result was that when the ground offensive began in
mid-February, it met minimal resistance and quickly swept
forward from Saudi Arabia all the way to the Euphrates River.
The magnitude of the aerial victory in the context of the
overall campaign was revealed by the almost unbelievably low
casualty rate suffered by coalition surface forces. 49
In previous wars, the impact of air power had always been
a bone of contention, the issue was an unresolved an
unsolvable debate. In the Gulf War, the impact of air power
was clearly overwhelming and decisive but similar results may
not occur in the next conflict. However, the nature of the
aerial victory is a sign of the ascendancy of air power in
modern warfare. It symbolizes the maturity of air power and
the need for a new paradigm of warfare.
Air power's greatest asset has always been its
flexibility: the range, speed, precision and punch of
aircraft make them ideal platforms for waging a war of
49The total number of coalition casualties during the Gulf
War were 331 dead. James F. Dunnigan & Austin Bay, From
Shield to Storm, (William Morrow and Company, New York: 1992)
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maneuver. Desert Storm demonstrated how a strategic air
campaign can paralyze and immobilize a modern industrialized
nation. Iraqi communications, transportation, and power
generating sites were rendered inoperative. The air war in
the Gulf devastated the Iraqi military infrastructure in only
six weeks
.
Air power achieved the main political goals of the
coalition and produced one of the most decisive victories in
history. At a cost of fewer than 2 00 coalition lives, nearly
150,000 Iraqi troops were killed or captured. 50 At the same
time, the number of civilian casualties as well as collateral
damage was kept to a minimum. A key player in the Coalition's
success was the widespread use of precision guided munitions.
They connected the political objectives to military execution
with a high degree of reliability. The political leadership
enjoyed greater confidence that discriminate force can be
applied to accomplish discrete objectives.
B. THE PRELUDE TO OFFENSIVE ACTION
On August 2, 1990, the very day of the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait President Bush declared a national emergency to address
the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States posed by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. 51 The
50James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm,
(New York: William Morrow and Co., 1992), p. 145.
51Executive Order 12722, 02 August 1990.
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president accompanied his words with action. Within a matter
of days a rapid mobilization and deployment of forces into the
region began.
Two carrier battle groups, led by the USS Independence
(CV-62) and the USS Eisenhower (CVN-69), were already on
station in the Gulf area. On the way were units of the Army's
82nd Airborne Division and F-15s from the Air Force's 1st
Tactical Fighter Wing, by 7 August they had arrived in Saudi
Arabia. Other U.S. and Coalition forces quickly followed in
the crucial six month buildup of Desert Shield.
The Navy carriers on station and the Air Force's 1st
Tactical Fighter Wing could defend Saudi airspace, but their
offensive-strike capability was limited. The ground forces in
the region were no match for the Iraqi armored divisions
poised on the Kuwait-Saudi border. Of necessity, the
Coalition's initial strategy was defensive.
During the six months leading up to the war, many things
that would have presented problems if the conflict had
occurred earlier were fixed. The transfer of personnel to the
theater provided the combat forces with access to key
technical and maintenance skills. Personnel for critical
slots were brought into the region and maintenance and supply
units had time to be brought up to wartime strength. However,
once the necessary assets for offensive action were available,
the initial defensive strategy became offensive.
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C. THE AIR WAR IN THE GULF
The Coalition's policy shifted from waiting for sanctions
implemented against Iraq to work to taking the strategic
offensive. On January 23, 1991, General Colin Powell
succinctly summarized the offensive strategy selected by the
coalition:
Our strategy to go after this Army is very,
very simple. First we're going to cut it off,
and then we're going to kill it. 52
The issue at hand was how to seize and exploit the initiative.
The plan to take the strategic offensive was broken into
four phases. The first three phases called for an all out air
campaign against Iraq. Postwar accounts describe the plan:
Phase One would be an air attack on Iraqi command,
control, and communications, attempting to sever Saddam in
Baghdad from his forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq.
Simultaneously airpower would destroy the Iraqi Air Force
and air defense system [as well as] Iraqi chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons facilities.
Phase Two would be a massive, continuous air
bombardment of Iraqi supply munitions bases,
transportation facilities and roads, designed
to cut off the Iraqi forces from their
supplies
.
Phase Three would be an air attack on the
entrenched Iraqi ground forces of 430,000 men
and the Republican Guard. 53
"Excerpts from Pentagon Briefing on 2 3 January 1991
reprinted in Andrew Rosenthal, "Pentagon is Confident on
War,", The New York Times , 24 January 1991, p. 1.
53Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical
Analysis of the Gulf War, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992),
p. 195.
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The fourth phase was the ground attack into Kuwait, but
clearly the emphasis was on employing Coalition air power
against Iraq.
In the early hours of 17 January, complete tactical
surprise was achieved in a coordinated attack delivered by
Tomahawk cruise missiles, aircraft from the USAF, USN, RAF,
RSAF, and helicopters from the US Army. The attack was
supported by a large scale electronic warfare effort to
disrupt Iraqi radars and communications. Integral to the
first two steps of the plan, and a major departure from past
air campaigns, was the widespread use of tactical aircraft
with precision guided munitions to achieve a strategic result.
The sea launched cruise missiles delivered 1,000 lb
warheads against the nerve centers of the Iraqi defense
system. The targets were command posts, ground control
headquarters and radar stations. The arrival of the Tomahawks
stimulated the Iraqi surveillance and surface to air missile
guidance radars, thereby disclosing their positions to air
launched anti-radiation missiles.
F-117As, operating at night without escort, made precision
attacks against strategic installations in Baghdad. The
aircraft can carry two laser guided 20001b bombs and is
officially a tactical aircraft. It illuminates a target by
laser, and then delivers a bomb onto a specific point within
the illumination producing weapon accuracies of one to two
feet. The 3 6 F-117As deployed to the Gulf flew 2 percent of
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the bombing missions but hit over 40 percent of the strategic
targets . 54
Elsewhere, packages of USAF F-llls, F-15s, USN A-6s, A-7s,
and F/A-18s attacked secondary command and control positions
and air defense units throughout Iraq. Again, the strike
planners relied on precision guided munitions, to such a
degree that over the course of the air campaign, Coalition
aircraft conducted 9,117 strikes with PGMs . This accounts for
2 percent of the total bombing missions, 8 percent of the
bomb tonnage and about 3 percent of the damage. 55 Never
before in a conflict had an air campaign relied upon such a
widespread use of precision guided munitions
The strike aircraft were closely supported by electronic
warfare aircraft. USAF EF-lllAs, EC-130s, and USN EA-6s
disrupted surveillance radars, communications between ground
controllers and fighters, the guidance of surface to air
missile systems. Iraqi radar operators increased their
transmitter's power as they attempted to break through the
jamming. This effort only made them more vulnerable to attack
from anti-radiation HARM missiles.
The entire air assault was coordinated by E-3A AWACS
aircraft and guided by a single air tasking order. Throughout
the period, Coalition fighters flew protective sweeps and
54James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm,
p. 161.
55Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) , Table 19-3.
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patrols. The result was that within 24 hours the Coalition
achieved control of Iraqi air space and through nearly
simultaneous actions, air power blinded the Iraqi leadership.
Phase one of the air campaign was complete in record time.
Although Desert Storm was conceived as a four-phased
campaign, the first three phases overlapped to the point that
they were nearly simultaneous. The results of the coordinated
air campaign was that when the ground offensive began in mid-
February, it met with minimal resistance.
D. SUMMARY
In the Gulf war, the impact of air power was clearly
decisive. Its contribution to the overall victory was such
that the ground campaign quickly swept from Saudi Arabia to
the Euphrates River in 100 hours with an unbelievably low
casualty, rate. At long last, air power lived up to its
potential and fulfilled the promises made by the early
prophets of air power.
For an air power advocate, the real breakthrough in the
war was the extensive use of precision guided munitions
against targets they are effective against. Even though
precision guided munitions were employed during the Vietnam
War, with a few exceptions, there just were not that many
targets that an accurate bomb was going to make a difference
against. The importance of Air Power in future conflicts will
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be determined largely by whether decisive precision targets
will exist.
Before I push the case for air power too far, the need for
precision targets highlights some of the controversy that
exists over whether air power alone can win the war. A
special circumstance existed that made possible the success of
air power in the Persian Gulf. The terrain in the Persian
Gulf is nearly ideal for offensive air operations. It is
nearly perfectly flat with little to no vegetation for an
enemy to hid in. This made the strike planner's job much
easier. Intelligence assets were able to locate and identify
fixed targets with relative ease. Unfortunately, this
condition is not a constant throughout the world, an obvious
example is the terrain found in the former Yugoslavia.
Also, the hunt for the Scud missile launchers highlighted
another issue that may limit the effectiveness of air power in
a future conflict. Precision guided munitions allow an
aircraft to be more effective against targets the pilot can
find. Unfortunately, there is still a problem with finding
the target in the first place. A problem exists in finding
mobile targets with current intelligence assets, even with the
given terrain advantages found in the Gulf region.
The elusive nature of the Scuds will convince any future
opponent to increase their inventory of mobile systems.
Unless we pay particular attention to this issue and improve
our intelligence capability to find relocatable targets, air
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power may be less decisive in the next conflict. This will
become increasingly evident if strategic targets are made
mobile. The performance of air power may be restricted
because intelligence simply may not be effective enough.
Even in the face of the previous limitations to air power,
it is now obvious bombing alone can win a war. There is no
longer any doubt that technology has finally validated air
power theory and that one can suggest that air power will play
a dominant role in modern war. However, it should not be
forgotten that the air war will be part of a much larger,
land, sea and air offensive. In this context, the next
chapter examines the role U.S. Naval air power can play
because of the existence of precision guided munitions.
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IV. THE IMPACT ON NAVAL AIR POWER
The end of the Cold War has markedly changed the emphasis
in all warfare areas. Regional power projection has taken on
increased importance since the decline of the Soviet Union.
As recently as five years ago, Ant i-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
was the primary warfare area emphasis for the United States
Navy. The U.S. Navy's priorities have changed, the spotlight
now shines on a different warfare specialty. The collapse of
the Soviet Union has diminished many warfare areas which were
specifically tuned to the Soviet threat. A reexamination of
future scenarios which the Navy may face, has brought power
projection, or Strike Warfare to the forefront.
The capability of the fleet to project power to foreign
shores has grown in recent years. Early capabilities of naval
fleets to project power were limited to the range of the guns
on a given naval platform. World War II introduced fixed wing
aerial strike warfare. Battle fleet commanders could now use
carrier based aircraft to deliver ordnance on foreign shores.
Although Doolittle's raid on Tokyo achieved more for U.S.
morale than it did in a tactical sense, it underscored the
capability of carriers to strike deep and deliver ordnance on
enemy territory. The ability to attack foreign shores without
occupying territory highlighted the versatility and autonomy
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of the aircraft carrier and its embarked airwing and marks the
origins of naval air power.
Since the Second World War the fleet has invested
considerable resources in fixed wing aircraft for power
projection. This effort has resulted in an impressive ability
to deliver ordnance, both conventional and until recently
nuclear, on enemy territory. Equally important, this
capability was independent of any host nation support. Since
World War II, the Navy has produced a proud legacy of fixed
wing attack aircraft. 56 Today, the F/A-18 and the A-6, with
their myriad of munitions, are the mainstay of the fixed wing
attack community.
In addition to the impressive capability of fixed wing
assets, the Navy has developed another method of delivering
ordnance on target, the Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile
(TLAM) . The development of the cruise missile was not a novel
concept. The idea of a cruise missile is as old as the German
VI rockets of WWII. The concept of a long range unmanned
autonomous strike vehicle impressed many U.S. war officials.
Immediately after the war, the United states commenced an
aggressive cruise missile development program of its own.
56The first dedicated attack aircraft was the Al-D
introduced into the fleet in July of 1944. The next attack
aircraft was the A3-D. It was introduced into the fleet in
March 1956. The A4-D1 was introduced into the inventory in
October 1956. The A-6 was introduced into the fleet in April
1960. In the spring of 1968 the Navy introduced the A-7A.
The Navy's newest attack aircraft, the F/A-18 was introduced
into the fleet in May 1980.
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Using the German rockets as models, the Navy developed two
cruise missiles of it's own, the Regulus I and II. Although
cruise missiles were kept operational into the early 1970 's,
they lacked the operational reliability and the accuracy which
ballistic missiles offered and were subsequently
discontinued. 57
The new generation of cruise missiles (TLAM's and TASM's)
have slowly evolved into weapon systems which can accurately
deliver substantial ordnance packages to ranges of
approximately 600 miles. 58 Although they had been introduced
into the fleet in the early 1980' s, cruise missiles remained
untested in combat for almost ten years. The first use of
cruise missiles in combat took place in Iraq on January 16,
1991. Cruise missiles, along with F-117 stealth aircraft were
used during the opening salvos of Desert Storm to attack
command and control headquarters and key governmental
installations. Although the effectiveness individual cruise
missile attacks are still being evaluated, the value of the
cruise missile as a power projection weapon is indisputable.
57Ronald Huisken, The Origin of The Strategic Cruise
Missile (New York: Preager, 1981) . p. 17.
58The Tomahawk cruise missile has two conventional warhead
variants. The conventional missile warhead is a 1000 lb Bull
Pup warhead. In addition to the conventional warhead, the
missile can also deploy a submunition package. The missile
flies a preprogrammed course placing the warhead on target
with great accuracy or deploying a bomblet package over a
designated area.
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Advanced unmanned systems complement advanced manned
systems. Some targets are more sensitive to a weapon's
accuracy, others to a weapon's payload. Henry S. Rowen
outlined the uses for both weapon systems; "their use
[missiles] should presumably be reserved for critical periods
for targets especially difficult for aircraft to handle. The
cheaper missiles can be made, the less binding the constraint.
Aircraft should be assigned principally to 1) targets with low
expected attrition, 2) targets which require large delivered
payloads, and 3) targets which have some location
uncertainty." 59 The true issue, from an operator's
perspective, is to assure a target's destruction or render it
inoperable with as little risk as possible. The result is
that the selection of weapons for a target is dependent upon
that target's defenses. The primary advantage of precision
guided munitions (PGM's) is they can destroy a target with a
minimum of weapons. In essence they exploit the economy of
force maxim of warfare. The importance of this fact is
relevant to naval air power. PGM's question the reasons why
naval air power is not an integral portion of any conventional
strategic air campaign. The issue of the limited fire power
available to naval air power, because of a ship's magazine
capacity, is no longer valid. Naval air power can make an
important contribution to any future strategic bombing
59Henry S. Rowen, The Future of Cruise Missiles
,
(Marina
del Rey, California: Pan Heuristics/RDA, 1980). pp. 21, 23.
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campaign; in some cases it may be the only way to get the job
done.
A. THREAT SCENARIOS
In both the fixed wing and cruise missile realm, the
"threat" has played an important role in the development of
weapon systems. The Cold War fueled the need for the Navy's
development of attack vehicles. The current- inventory of
aircraft and cruise missiles reflects the difficult task of
penetrating the Soviet Union's anti air warfare (AAW) systems
and delivering ordnance on Soviet soil. For example, the A-
6
is designed to be an all weather, day or night strike
aircraft. It was designed to penetrate Soviet AAW defenses by
flying a low, terrain hugging profile in any type of weather.
Initially, the cruise missile was developed to compete with
the Soviet anti-ship cruise missile. Later, its role was
expanded to include a land attack version. Because of the
diminished threat from the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), the U.S. Navy can no longer hinge its entire threat
projections or procurement strategy on the familiar mission of
power projection into the Soviet Union.
The old strategy dealt with the Soviet Navy and mainland
air defenses. The new strategy must focus on contingency
operations against an assortment of enemies, in any region of
the globe. Although there are no direct military threats to
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the United States, threats to our national interest are
increasing in many regions of the globe.
Although the need to project power deep into the Soviet
Union is no longer a pressing military requirement, many
aspects of the power projection problem have remained the
same. Much of the equipment which the CIS produced has been
sold to other countries, many of them unstable "third world"
nations in volatile regions of the world. Additionally, the
proliferation of Western advanced weapon systems compounds the
problem.
None of these countries or any of the theorized third
world scenarios present the vast array of AAW systems deployed
in the former Soviet Union. However, many of these countries
already possess enough pieces of the old Soviet AAW network to
complicate an otherwise easy strike warfare mission. The
current economic conditions throughout the former Soviet Union
lend credence to the stipulation that some of the more up-to-
date models may be up for sale as well. So, although the
Soviets are a diminished threat, the proliferation of their
equipment and Western equipment has created other viable
threats throughout the world. 60 The need for a robust power
projection capability has not diminished, in fact many contend
that it has increased.
60According to Janes Weapons Systems , some of the Soviet
AAW systems which are in third world inventories include: SA-
5, CIS and Syria; SA-6, CIS and "others"; SA-2, CIS and
"others"; SA-3, CIS and others.
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In any anticipated power projection scenario, the Navy
will rely on both strike aircraft and cruise missile assets
presumably used in a complementary way dependent on the
scenario. The uncertainty and instability inherent in many
regions requires extensive military planning for contingency
strike missions. If the basic guidelines from the Gulf War
remain, strike missions must be planned for maximum
effectiveness against the target and equally important, must
minimize collateral damage to civilians.
Missions for both of these weapons systems must emphasize
flexibility and accuracy in order to handle a wide range of
contingencies in a variety of environmental and political
climates. Strike missions will be conventional responses with
limited military objectives. They will be required to engage
high tech mobile defenses, and will require increased accuracy
to minimize U.S. losses. Once the decision to use strike
forces has been made, appropriate targets could include enemy
C3 assets, leadership, supporting military industries, as well
as conventional military targets. In addition, strike forces
could be tasked to perform preemptive strikes designed to
incapacitate an aggressor's offensive military capabilities
before hostilities begin.
Another mission which will occupy a prominent role in any
strike planning folder is the destruction of fixed or
relocatable targets of a strategic nature. Ballistic missile
launchers, both mobile and fixed, and nuclear, chemical and
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biological weapons processing plants are two of the most
prominent . A third strike mission would be the destruction of
enemy shipping. For the foreseeable future, fixed wing attack
aircraft and cruise missiles will be the basis for the Navy's
power projection forces. 61
This paper examines the technologies and developments
which effect these two weapon systems. Emerging technologies
significantly influence these weapon platforms; however, the
political and economic climate may be a greater influence on
each of these systems than technology. This evaluation
considers the cost of these new systems in only a broad sense.
Predicting future military appropriations is an impossible
task; however, cost ratios with respect to existing
technologies can be considered. The technological innovations
which are examined are all evolutionary vice revolutionary in
nature.
B. CARRIER BASED STRIKE AIRCRAFT
U.S. military strategy is based upon three fundamentals:
deterrence, a rapid response to crisis and alliance
solidarity. The U.S. Navy supports a forward offensive
strategy to achieve both a deterrent and a quick reaction
strike capability. Specifically, one or several carrier
61From an interview with Dr. James Brooke, Strategic
Planning Departmenthead, Convair Cruise Missile Division, by
LCDR Sam Perez, 24 February 1992, Monterey, California.
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battle groups would deploy to a region which experienced a
crisis affecting U.S. interests. The inherent flexibility of
a carrier battle group to conduct operations against a
belligerent gives the United States a credible response to any
regional crisis located near a coastline (within approximately
10 miles) without having to rely on basing agreements.
The chief combat functions of a carrier battle group
include "attack against land targets... as well as air
superiority in the area of operations." The battle group
commander has two strike options at his disposal, a Tomahawk
Land Attack Missile (TLAM) or an air strike made by the
airwing. Aviation has the unique ability to concentrate
firepower rapidly at the critical place and time, which allows
exploitation of the economy of force maxim. The two strike
systems allow a commander to utilize the strengths of each one
in a combined arms effort. The advantages of TLAM against
heavily defended fixed point targets will be discussed later.
The airwing 's strength is to penetrate a moderately defended
area or point target with assured destruction. The primary-
advantage lies in the myriad of weapons the strike aircraft
can deliver, which can be tailored to assure a target's
destruction.
In order to conduct air operations, the carrier's embarked
airwing totals around 90 aircraft, with approximately 24
fighters (F-14) , 24 light attack (F/A-18), and 10 medium
attack (A-6) aircraft comprising the strike force.
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Antisubmarine warfare, electronic warfare, tankers and
airborne early warning aircraft support the strike force and
make up the remainder of the airwing. During a regional
crisis, the carrier airwing is undoubtedly the most visible
and potent response possessed by the United States and the
least intrusive until called into use.
The carrier battle group will continue to remain an
integral part of any power projection operation. The concern
is how well the airwing can perform the strike mission in the
future. An assessment of the Navy's carrier based air strike
capability concentrates on the F/A-18 and its associated
weapon systems. The A-6, for the most part, is ignored since
it represents older technology, but the impact of the
aircraft's age on the strike mission is discussed in detail.
The F/A-18 Hornet is an all weather multi-mission single
pilot high performance fighter/attack aircraft. The pilot
operates the aircraft with the aid of a digital flight control
computer and a mission computer. The Hornet has a top speed
of 1.8 Mach, thanks to its twin 16000 pound thrust General
Electric F4 04 engines, and can sustain high aerodynamic loads
in excess of 7 G's. The dual nature capability of the
aircraft equates to a better war fighting capability and
increases the flexibility of a response to any threat. 62
"Kenneth Kendall, "Electronic advances on the F/A-li
Hornet," National Defense , May-June 1983, pp. 22-23.
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Unfortunately, this dual capability is attained by sacrificing
combat range.
The APG-65 radar is the heart of the weapon system. It
can track multiple airborne targets and provide highly
accurate release solutions for the myriad of air to ground
weapon systems employed by the Hornet. The APG-65 is a
digital radar able to provide the pilot with navigational and
targeting information. The radar employs a high pulse
repetition frequency (PRF) for a long range search capability
at ranges in excess of 100 miles and ranging for weapons
delivery against targets within 50 miles. 63 The combination
of the F/A-18's sensors, the laser spot tracker, the forward
looking infra-red (FLIR) and the APG-65, allows the pilot to
automatically compute air to surface ranging data for targets
obscured by weather or darkness.
Self-protection and warning equipment outfitted in the
F/A-18 include: the ALR-67 radar warning receiver, the ALE-3 9
counter measures dispenser, and the AN/ALQ-12 6 defensive
electronic countermeasures system. The ALR-67 detects radar
guided threats and displays them visually to the pilot. The
other systems operate in a variety of ways to increase the
aircraft's survivability in a high threat environment. 64
"James B. Shultz, "Marines Put F/A-18 's to the Test,"
Defense Electronics , November, 1983, p. 111.
64Ibid, p. 110.
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The most important electronic advancement incorporated in
the F/A-18 is the stores management system (SMS) which
controls the aircraft's deployment of its vast array of
weapons and external stores. The system is a state of the art
digital avionics computer with the flexibility to add future
weapon systems with only a software change. The SMS not only
allows the pilot to release munitions, but it does it in an
aerodynamical ly balanced manner. The system maintains an
inventory of stores, types, locations, quantities, status,
special conditions for release sequencing and displays this
information to the pilot. The result is a reduction in the
pilot's work load in flight through automation in the control
of a weapon's fuzing, release sequence, and any interface
requirement with a smart weapon. 65
The Hornet as a package is an impressive array of
sophisticated technology, but several criteria must be
explored prior to a judgement on effectiveness. One primary
consideration of the effectiveness of a strike aircraft is the
range the aircraft can fly with a specific payload. The
effectiveness of PGM's suggest the lower number of weapons
represent the most appropriate point for comparison. Other
important considerations include survivability, reliability
and maintainability. The combination of these criterion
6SKenneth Kendall, pp. 22-23
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produce the overall effectiveness of an airwing's ability to
conduct a strike mission.
The major drawback to the Hornet is its strike radius,
without any inflight refueling. Once ranges exceed
approximately 600 miles the F/A-18 requires inflight refueling
to execute its mission without reducing its payload. In the
attack mission the limited range is augmented with the use of
inflight refueling and/or external fuel tanks. The aircraft's
capability to deliver munitions accurately compensates for its
ordnance quantity limitation. Precision guided munitions
compensate even further for the Hornet's range limitations.
A comparison in the maximum ranges for each of the two
primary attack aircraft, on a high-low-high profile with 1000
pound Mk-83 bombs, yields the following information:
LOAD F/A-18 A-6
4 Mk-83 706 1000
6 MK-83 630 950
9 Mk-83 495 775
12 Mk-83 359 600
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget office, Costs of
Modernizing the Navy's Carrier Based Air Forces , P. 43.
An immediate observation is that the A-6 has more range than
the F-18 at any weapons load. However, even though the Hornet
cannot achieve 'the ranges of the A-6, it does have an
impressive range with either 4 or 6 Mk 83s. The affect of the
Hornet's range limitation is much mitigated with today's
inventory of precision guided munitions which equate to one
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bomb per target and allow us to utilize the lowest number of
weapons in the loadout . -
The Hornet's survivability and agility/maneuverability is
a marked improvement over the performance of the A-6. The
combination of the aircraft's strengths make the Hornet the
most flexible and potent asset in the attack role. The
current problems with the A-6's service life without any
replacement in the near future imply a heavier reliance will
be placed upon the F/A-18 to complete the strike mission.
Unfortunately, the aircraft was not designed to have the range
or bad weather penetrating characteristics of a medium attack
aircraft. The range limitation is the most serious of the two
problems. If the Navy is to retain a deep strike capability
and participate fully in a strategic air campaign, a
replacement for the aging A-6 is required if the Navy is
maintain a credible long range strike capability against
targets which a TLAM is ineffective.
The combined effect of technology upon the carrier
airwing, both now and in the near future, has created a potent
strike force able to complete surgical strike missions. Naval
aviation is clearly a major player in the completion of any
strike mission today. The airwing can complete the mission in
the future only with the continued development of priority
weapon systems. The development of new strike aircraft is
necessary only for the medium attack role. The F/A-18 can
complete the light attack mission for the next 2 years
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without a replacement, but the A-6 needs a replacement now.
Exactly when a replacement will become operational is anyone's
guess, but it should exploit the advantages offered by stealth
technology.
Today the aircraft delivered weapons for use in land
attack consist of several technologically advanced weapons.
Walleye (an electro-optically guided glide bomb) , Laser Guided
Bombs, the Stand Off Land Attack Missile (SLAM: which
incorporates GPS for mid-course guidance and an IF, sensor for
terminal guidance) , Shrike and Harm (anti-radiation
missiles-ARM' S) , and others make up the current inventory of
smart weapons which can be used in a strike mission. The
scientific community developed the technology incorporated by
these weapons in the 1960 's and 1970 's and have worked ever
since to improve their capabilities. The systems which exist
today represent evolutionary "state of the art" improvements
incorporated in the 3 year development of these technologies.
The weapons in the inventory today all have their
drawbacks. LGB's are unusable against a weather obscured
target and their effectiveness is degraded by haze and smoke.
Any electro-optically (EO) guided munitions, like Walleye, has
the same weather restrictions as LGB's. An added complication
is the issue of Walleye's reliability which is questionable.
The newer EO weapons, like SLAM, do have increased
reliability but their small numbers in the inventory makes the
Walleye the primary EO system. However, the assembly line for
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Walleye I and II has been closed for some time and weapons in
the inventory have been on the shelf for quite a while, some
since the mid-1970 's. Experience with Walleye suggest a major
limitation exists for sophisticated weapons; shelf life and
reliability are inversely related. The problem becomes more
severe and will affect other "smart" systems in the future if
budgetary constraints force a longer shelf life. Solid state
electronics and on the shelf testing can reduce the problem,
but the rate of failure for any given weapon will increase
with age.
Developments in the tactical aircraft and sophisticated
weapons have been incremental rather than revolutionary.
However, the incremental developments in the field of weapons
technology, by the very magnitude of their increased
capability, do have a revolutionary impact upon warfare. The
key contributing technologies are microelectronics, aerospace,
composite materials, energy, and telecommunications.
Developments within these fields include: powerful imbedded
computers, the size of a small chip, which will be standard in
modern weapon systems; significant aerospace gains, to include
extension of range, duration of flight, reliability, stealth
capabilities, stand-off detection, and stand-off targeting at
substantially greater ranges. One of the most dramatic
improvements has been the in the area of weapons accuracy, the
ability now exists to target precision guided munitions at
long ranges with pinpoint accuracy.
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In broad concept, the new weapon systems employing these
third generation technologies are able to inflict substantial
damage upon any opposition. The combination of increased
range, accuracy and penetration capabilities of new weapon
systems enhances military effectiveness at the strategic and
tactical levels of warfare. Pinpoint accuracy and
significantly enhanced lethality reduces: aircraft sorties
(which increases survivability) , the amount of ordnance
required to ensure a target's destruction, and associated
logistic requirements. The jump in capability mandates a
review of current tactics and strategy to exploit these new
weapon systems and stealth technology properly. One aspect is
certain, the post 1992 generation of weapons will include a
new family of gravity bombs, some with guidance systems, one
or two new weapons for stand off attacks from both point and
area defenses and a small family of antiradiation missiles for
the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)
.
The application- of the Global Positioning System (GPS) in
both aircraft and munitions is a dramatic increase in existing
capability. Current aircraft navigation systems drift an
average of 0.5 to 1.5 miles per hour. The systems today can
be updated inflight but the drift remains internal to the
system. GPS equipped aircraft have an accurate drift free
navigation system and have a significant edge in the
successful execution of any strike. GPS assists a pilot in
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locating a target and allows for the attack of known fixed
targets by bombing strictly on coordinates.
The largest drawback to GPS is that the system requires
about 2 seconds to establish a geographical fix, about 2
seconds. The GPS signal from the satellites is constant but
current hardware updates geographical positions periodically
and not constantly. The difficulty is its inapplicability to
short time of fall /flight ordnance. The current programs
under development include placing GPS into free fall gravity
bombs and cruise missiles. Munitions release above
approximately 20,000 feet would be required to meet the 20
second requirement. Unfortunately naval tactical aviation
does not currently use high altitude bombing as a primary
tactic. A separate issue is the subject of mobile targets
which require a different type of sensor to obtain precision
accuracy.
The current projects under joint development are the Joint
Standoff Weapon (JSOW) and the Joint Directed Aided Munitions
(JDAM) . The two programs incorporate state of the art
guidance technology and are evolutionary developments of LGB's
and Walleye. The infusion of technology into the munitions
field enables these new precise weapons to utilize more than
one sensor to discriminate a target. The result is an
increased all weather capability which negates the degradation




The JSOW is a non-powered inertial aided munitions.
Navigation is provided by a GPS aided ring laser navigation
system and an onboard digital computer. 66 The weapon system
has two payloads . Either a unitary warhead or a series of
BLU-108 submunitions can be delivered to a target. Terminal
guidance is anticipated to be an Imaging Infrared seeker.
The anticipated standoff range keeps the delivery aircraft out
of range of area and point air defense systems. The baseline
model consists of two versions which will deliver submunitions
into an area to destroy mobile targets.
The JDAM program is simply a kit designed to augment the
current gravity bomb family. 67 The program incorporates
inertial navigation to improve weapon accuracy if a target's
position is known. Short time of fall weapons will use a GPS
update from the delivery platform but does not use GPS for
navigation. Instead, a ring laser gyro provides inertial
navigation to the munitions. The resulting system drift is
negligible with a short time of fall release, current releases
rarely exceed a 10 second time of fall. The significant
improvement is the incorporation of a second sensor into the
weapon. Currently a variety of sensors are being examined,
their cost effectiveness appears to be the primary decision
66AIRTEVRON FIVE Briefing Notes, "Concept of Operations
for the Joint Standoff Weapon System," November, 25, 1992.
67The information regarding JDAM is drawn from CAF 401-91-
I-A, Joint CAF/USN Requirements Document for Joint Direct
Attack Munitions (JDAM) Program.
64
factor. The four most prominent are either a millimeter wave,
a synthetic aperture radar, a conventional radar, or an infra-
red sensor. 68 The incorporation of any of these sensors
allows a delivery against a known target obscured in bad
weather conditions or by smoke.
The weapon system is designed for missions against a
target defended by moderate close in anti-aircraft weapons.
Currently, operational testing of JDAM is achieving accuracies
similar to Tomahawk's. Additionally, JDAM's warhead possesses
similar performance characteristics to Tomahawk's. The system
allows the planner a low cost option to TLAMs for use against
lower threat targets, the intent is to reserve TLAMs for the
heavily defended, high threat, targets. The logic for this
approach is found in the cost comparison between the two
weapons
.
Phase I of JDAM is the development of the basic guided
munitions and has been completed with a cost per copy of
40,000 dollars. 69 Phase II and III, the development of a new
high explosive and the incorporation of a second sensor, are
still in the formative stages but the estimated cost of all
three stages of development is estimated at 100 thousand
dollars per copy. On the other hand, the average cost of a
68George Leopold, "Military Focuses on Sensors, Target
Recognition," Defense News, February 8-14, 1993, Vol. 8 No.
5, pp. 12-13.
69CAF 401-91-I-A, p. 3.
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Tomahawk is between $800,000 to $1,000,000. On a cost per
weapon basis, JDAM is clearly the weapon of choice. The
caveats to this point are the possibility of aircraft
attrition must be minimal and/or the cost of a TLAM is not
significantly reduced.
The most impressive advances in weapons technology is in
the area of smart weapons. The necessity to penetrate an
enemy's air defenses is getting more difficult as defensive
systems become more advanced. The evolution of smart
precision guided weapons and aircraft have been to counter
these higher technology defensive systems. Today, the
capability exists for aircraft to create a sanctuary within
which they can operate in this hostile environment. The
development of naval air power has been reactive to the
increased capabilities in defensive systems. The associated
technology has developed in a logical and incremental manner
to encompass the current "state of the art" systems. The
capabilities the airwing possesses in precision accuracy, and
will possess in the future, ensures that naval tactical
aviation remains a participant in any future strike scenario.
C. CRUISE MISSILES
Many Navy officials, both civilian and uniformed, realized
a requirement for cruise missiles in the 1960's. As early as
1966, then Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze agreed to a
proposal submitted by Captains Zumwalt and Bagley which laid
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the groundwork for the Navy's eventual adoption of the
Submarine Launched ' Cruise Missile (SLCM)
.
70 However, the
leadership within the Navy was undecided on the idea of a
cruise missile. Since WW II, the "carrier admirals" had risen
to ascendance and had pushed the carrier and its associated
airwing as the primary weapon system in the Navy. The
submarine forces, with the advent of nuclear power and
submarine launched ballistic missiles, were gaining new
stature within the Naval hierarchy. The "surface admirals"
were in no position to influence significant projects without
the aid of either of the other two factions or another
powerful driver.
The actual conception of the Tomahawk cruise missile was
a result of the collaboration between the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt and Defense Secretary Melvin
Laird. The CNO wanted to develop a tactical ant i -ship cruise
missile while the Secretary of Defense wanted to develop a
strategic cruise missile to use in the Salt negotiations. 71
New technological developments enabled the new missile to
achieve greater ranges and accuracies than the older 1950 's
versions. The new gas turbine engine technology enabled
70Robert J. Art and Stephen E. Ockenden, "The Domestic
Politics of Cruise Missile Development, 1970-1980, " in Cruise
Missiles Technology, Strategy, Politics , ed. by Richard K.
Betts (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p.
381.
71Art and Ockenden, p. 3 84.
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engineers to use cheap light turbofan or turbojet engines
which could achieve ranges in excess of 2000 kilometers. In
addition, the new microelectronics technology in aircraft
guidance and inertial navigation was easily adaptable to the
new missiles and enabled the missiles to reach accuracies
which could not be achieved by any other existing missiles.
These developments made the new missile extremely attractive
to both the Secretary of Defense and the CNO. As a result,
the Secretary of Defense directed the development of the
strategic cruise missile in June of 1972 . Even in the early
stages of development, cruise missile rationalization was a
delicate matter. When asked whether there was a threat
driving the development of the cruise missile, Robert N.
Parker, Principal Deputy Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, answered: "No threat, but a real need considering
both the tactical and the strategic requirements." 72
D. DESERT STORM CRUISE MISSILE LESSONS LEARNED
Although Tomahawk cruise missiles had been deployed to the
fleet for several years, Desert Storm was the first time the
Navy fired TLAMs in combat. Even though the operational tests
were extremely promising, few commanders had the confidence or
practical knowledge necessary to employ Tomahawk effectively.
72U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Re-
search and Development Subcommittee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 17
March 1976, pp. 6201.
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Commanders lacked confidence in the cruise missile and its
ability to deliver ordnance accurately. 73 They had to be
convinced that cruise missiles could be used effectively under
real combat conditions. Initially, many commanders and their
staffs were reluctant to use cruise missiles against high
priority targets unless sufficient numbers were allocated. 74
Tomahawk's performance during Desert Storm permanently erased
any doubts. Although TLAM employment highlighted both the
strengths and weaknesses of the new weapon system, the
strengths far outweighed the weaknesses . Current improvements
to TLAM are using these lessons learned to guide future
upgrades to cruise missiles. These lessons can be grouped
into three categories, mission planning, missile utility, and
battle damage assessment.
The sudden Iraqi invasion of Kuwait highlighted a crucial
weakness in cruise missile employment, the time delay of
mission planning. There were no missions planned for either
Kuwait or Iraq at the beginning of the conflict. 75 Neither
of the Cruise Missile Support Activities (CMSA) had the
required Terrain Contour Mapping (TERCOM) or Digital Scene
Mapping Area Correlator (DSMAC) scenes for mission planning.
As a result, the first TLAM missions could not have been





delivered in theater promptly, had not the opening of
hostilities been delayed for almost six months. 76
A separate issue associated with planning cruise missile
strikes during the Gulf War was the lack of expertise
available to the on-scene commander. Few people on CENTCOM
staff had any practical experience with cruise missiles. The
staff was unfamiliar with either the requirements for a cruise
missile strike, or the capabilities of the weapon. Many
thought that cruise missiles could be brought to bear
immediately. Others believed that cruise missiles were of
little or no practical use in the Kuwait theater. Few
realized that cruise missile targeting was an extremely
complicated process which would require extensive time and
resources
.
Targeting for any strike mission is a sophisticated
process. The first step for any targeteer is a thorough
analysis of the mission objectives. The targeteer must
familiarize himself with all applicable OPLANs and with the
strategic concepts germane to the conflict. The second step
is the selection of appropriate targets. Again, this requires
a fundamental grasp of both the tactical and strategic
objectives. The next step is choosing the appropriate weapon.
Weaponeers must be consulted in order to determine target
76The information is from the notes of a brief by James
Adams, LDCR USN, "Strike Warfare Architecture," obtained from
LCDR Sam Perez, 6 April 1992, Monterey, California.
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vulnerabilities to various weapons. The selected targets can
then be matched up to corresponding availability of weapons.
Following the selection of the appropriate warhead/weapon, the
planner then decides which delivery platform is the most
appropriate for the mission. The planner takes into
consideration the degree of control required for the mission,
whether or not the risk of collateral damage exists and is a
significant issue, and to what degree risks to U.S. personnel
can be accepted. The strike planner then determines which
routes will be used and for cruise missile strikes whether
TERCOM and DSMAC assets are available. Target defenses,
navigation aides, and launch points must also be carefully
considered during this process. The final step in the
targeting process is mission assessment. The targeteer must
utilize various assets to determine whether or not the attack
was successful.
The current method for planning cruise missile strikes
involves a complicated procedure which is not controlled by
the tactical commander. The procedure requires the
coordination and compilation of data by the CMSA. In order
for a targeting package to be generated, a unit must request
a targeting package from their respective CMSA. The CMSA will
then gather data from the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) for
both the TERCOM navigation system and the DSMAC terminal
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guidance system. 77 In order to construct a mission profile,
the CMSA must first have the requisite information. They must
have accurate terrain maps available to identify the pre-
determined points along the missile's flight path and current
imagery for DSMAC. If the data is available, the process can
be completed in a relatively short period, but it is still a
time consuming process. If not, the process may take as long
as 3 days to build. Even if the information is on hand, this
time requirement places heavy restrictions on the tactical
utility of land attack cruise missiles. The cruise missile,
as it exists today, is not suitable to every scenario.
The effectiveness of land attack cruise missiles is a
function of warhead lethality and terminal guidance accuracy.
The precision of Tomahawk combined with the effects of a 1000
lb warhead enables the cruise missile planner to engage a wide
variety of targets. However, in order to obtain the required
accuracy, each target set must be supported by a specific pre-
planned mission.
During Desert Storm, cruise missiles were utilized against
command and control centers, electrical power plants,
information control and processing facilities, chemical and
nuclear processing plants, and other supporting industries,
such as oil and production facilities. Although these targets
77John Haystead, "Autonomous Weapons -Are We Smart Enough
for Them?," Defense Electronics, February 1992, Vol. 24, No.
2
. , pp 31-32.
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were effectively engaged, there were other targets which could
not be engaged by cruise missiles.
The dependence of the cruise missile on fixed waypoints
for guidance information makes it unable to engage relocatable
targets. Because of their mobility, Scud launchers could not
be targeted by cruise missiles. In addition to mobile
targets, TLAMs were also ineffective against hardened bunkers.
Cruise missile warheads lack either the kinetic energy or a
sufficiently large warhead to penetrate and destroy hardened
personnel bunkers. Further, if the surrounding area is
damaged by other strike assets, the DSMAC scene may be damaged
or altered, requiring construction of another targeting
package.
Another restriction to cruise missile utility is the
inability to accurately predict their time of arrival on a
target. This restriction prevents a closely coordinated
cruise missile and fixed wing strike mission. Instead , the
current tactics call for fixed wing strikes to be preceded by
a cruise missile strike or they are conducted autonomously.
Another aspect of cruise missile utility is its ability to
engage different target sets. Mission planning flexibility
and response time were the two of the most important areas
which needed improvement during Desert Storm cruise missile
operations. Because cruise missile targeting is performed by
units which are not directly subordinated to the battle group
commander or the even the theater commander, the response
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times for mission planning are not necessarily compatible with
tactical timeline requirements. The battle group commander
must have a system which he can program, target, utilize, and
evaluate in a tactical engagement. The system must be
flexible enough to respond to changing tactical scenarios, and
even fluid strategic requirements. The current cruise missile
targeting system is not suited for this type of short term
tactical environment.
The agency which supported the bulk of CMSA's cruise
missile targeting requirements was the Defense Mapping Agency
(DMA). At the beginning of hostilities, only six primary
routes were available. 78 Many of the routes required
overflight approval from adjacent countries. In order to
support cruise missile operations for Desert Storm the DMA
mobilized 3 shifts for round the clock operations. Many of
the most desirable routes were unavailable due to lack of
terrain features or lack of information. Clearly, this was
not a tactically flexible weapons system which would lend
itself to theater or battle group level employment. However,
the new improvements discussed in the next section enable
future cruise missiles to overcome these limitations.
78Lengerich, "TLAM Targeting During Desert Storm"
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E. TECHNOLOGICAL DRIVERS AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
Both the mission planning and the missile utilization
problems are being addressed by new technological innovations.
The drivers for these improvements stem from a variety of
evolutionary technological innovations and upgrades. The
first of these innovations is the ability to miniaturize many
of the components used in the terminal guidance sensors. The
miniaturization of the guidance section decreases the weight
of the unit which increases the range of the missile. The
second most important area of innovation is engine design and
alternate fuels utilization. The final area of improvement
lies in the improvement of communications data links.
The most significant and immediate guidance innovation is
the addition of Global Positioning Systems (GPS) units to the
missile's guidance units. GPS is a satellite based system
which derives its accuracy from a cluster of existing
navigational satellites. The GPS precursor, TERCOM, requires
a certain amount of elevation change to function properly. If
the terrain does not have the required variation in terrain
contour, alternate routes must be utilized.
The incorporation of GPS will increase overall system
accuracy. Most importantly it will reduce the mission
planning timeline to as little as 3 hours. 79 The GPS
guidance units are not dependent on these geographic
79John Haystead, "Autonomous Weapons-Are We Smart Enough
for Them?, " p. 32.
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limitations and allow the cruise missile to work in areas with
flat terrain where radar altimeters do not provide enough
discrimination.
Terminal accuracy and flexibility are being improved by a
number of other technical innovations. The first of these is
the development of Imaging Infrared Radar (I2R) . I2R is one
of the leading candidates for cruise missile terminal
guidance. In addition to its demonstrated accuracy, it is one
of the most mature systems in the development queue. It can
distinguish between 2-D/3-D features and can also
differentiate between various regions and boundaries which are
defined by contrasts. Although it is a leading candidate, I2R
is affected by weather, and is susceptible to target
variability and reference adequacy. I2R, like all of the
other contending systems except DSMAC, limits the missile's
terminal trajectory.
The second system under consideration is Synthetic
Aperture Radar (SAR) . This terminal seeker innovation is an
all weather unit with a significant range increase over all
other systems. In addition to being costly, SAR technology is
not as mature as I2R technology, and requires a significant
increase in power. It is also limited to specific terminal
trajectories. Like I2R, SAR suffers from reference adequacy.
The missile's reliability is therefore dependent upon a
reflected signal from the target. The nature of the target's
ability to reflect the signal influences the range of
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acquisition of the target. A reduced range of acquisition
decreases the likelihood of a cruise missile acquiring the
target
.
Laser Radar (LADAR) is a terminal guidance unit which
offers a significant increase in accuracy. It will be able to
distinguish 3-D and 2-D height specific targets. Like DSMAC,
it can utilize terrain elevation. LADAR also offers ease of
reference scene preparation. In addition, it offers one of
the highest probabilities of acquisition. LADAR suffers from
a lack of system maturity and high cost. In addition, LADAR
is also affected by weather and is susceptible to high power
requirements and stringent cooling requirements.
Real Beam Millimeter Wave (MMW) terminal guidance units
are a low cost alternative with limited all weather
applications. On the other hand it is one of the least
accurate systems. In addition, MMW guidance units have
significant target type limitations and increase missile
observability
.
The final guidance system in consideration for cruise
missile upgrades is Forward Looking DSMAC, or DSMAC IIA. This
system is a low cost alternative to other systems. In
addition to expanding the scene availability and simplifying
mission planning, it also reduces diurnal and seasonal launch
restrictions. Another advantage of DSMAC IIA is its
reliability and the ease of backfit with existing systems.
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Like its predecessor, it can be affected by weather or target
definition.
The incorporation of either SAR, I2R, LADAR, or MMW
guidance units enhances the overall capability of the cruise
missile. Tomahawks will be able to engage a larger set of
targets with better accuracy. They will be able to engage
relocatable targets- such as ballistic missile launchers and
many other target sets which are not readily supported by
digital scene construction. Although they will not be able to
penetrate super hardened bunkers, the increased accuracy will
enable the missile to destroy critical communications, and
power sources leading to and from the bunker. 80
Additionally, the missile will no longer be restricted to
either a land or sea based mission.
The result is the cruise missile will become an even more
and capable flexible weapon system. The increased flexibility
demands increased operator knowledge and familiarity but it
does mean a dramatic reduction in the planning time
requirements. The result is that the main restriction to
Tomahawk's real time use is no longer applicable.
In addition to increased accuracy, the new guidance units
will enable the missile to achieve precise time on top
arrivals. By incorporating better navigational data and
precise timekeeping capabilities from GPS, the new missiles
80Brooke interview.
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will be able to achieve precise arrival times at the target.
Missions which could not be planned due to imprecise
coordination of cruise missile attacks and fixed wing arrival
times are now possible. This enables cruise missiles to
assume a leading edge strike posture. Cruise missiles can
attack enemy air defenses, freeing fixed wing assets for
precision bombing missions. This innovation represents a
significant capability increase in combined arms strike
mission with fixed wing aircraft.
In the area of missile propulsion, two significant
innovations offer significant performance improvement for
cruise missiles. The first of these is the improvement in
engine designs. Light weight engines with increased thrust to
weight ratios have increased speed and altitude performance,
and improved rates of climb. In addition, the increased
performance will enable a significant decrease in fuel
consumption. The second innovation is the use of alternate
fuels. In conjunction with the improvement in engine
performance, alternate fuels will enable the new generation of
cruise missiles to achieve ranges in excess of 1000 NM.
In the strategic sense, the increase in range offers a
dramatic shift in cruise missiles utility. In addition to
current tactical usages, the extended range increases the
cruise missile's strategic utility. In all of these areas
power projection capabilities and limitations will be an
important part of any contingency plan. The increased
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performance of the engines makes all but a few regions of the
world accessible to cruise missile strikes. Strategically,
cruise missiles can be utilized in almost all areas of
instability. In the past, rapid power projection capability
was centered around the carrier battle group. Today, in
addition to tethering carrier battle groups to certain
volatile regions of the world, the Joint Staff has now begun
tethering cruise missile platforms to certain regions. 81 In
conjunction with the carrier air wing, the theater commander
has cruise missiles available to plan a contingency operation.
The limitation of numbers afloat, or available to a commander,
remains and important issue. But the high accuracy of both
manned and unmanned weapon systems reduces the impact of this
restriction. The theater commander now has available a more
potent strategic arsenal.
F . RECOMMENDATIONS
Although these new innovations enable significant
improvement to both cruise missile and fixed wing strike
aircraft capabilities, their implementation is subject to the
ongoing budget battle. In the wake of the Soviet collapse,
Congress is less willing to fund costly programs to improve
weapon systems which they view as "good enough" and which many
lawmakers view as sufficient to handle future threats. The
81Roy Balaconis, Commander USN, "World Wide Crisis
Conference Brief, " August 1991, Washington D.C.
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current price of 1.3 million per missile is in excess of the
targeted price of 0.8 million per missile. Unless massive
quantities of the upgraded missile are produced, the projected
costs will rise significantly. According to RADM Wagner, the
PEO for Cruise Missile Project and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,
the total R&D and procurement costs for the new improvements
range from 1.0 to. 2.3 billion dollars, plus or minus 50
million dollars. 82 Although the new cruise missile offers
the opportunity to engage the enemy without any risk to U.S.
pilots, lawmakers may view the price of the upgrades as too
high.
Precision guided munitions innovations enable one weapon
system to perform both sea control and power projection roles.
In the role of sea control, they enable the engagement of
individual ships in heavy background shipping environments.
In the land attack role they can overcome many of the
disadvantages of current cruise missile/fixed wing weapon
systems including relocatable targets, and targets which
require faster planning-to-shooter coordination. Although the
cruise missile is not a system designed to replace fixed wing
strike assets, it can handle a wider variety of missions thus
enabling fixed wing assets to be used for more critical
82 The information is from the notes of a brief by G.F.A.
Wagner, RADM USN, PEO for Cruise Missiles Project and Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Joint Project, "Tomahawk Baseline IV, "
obtained from LCDR Sam Perez, June, 1992, Monterey,
California.
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missions. The combination of the two systems provides a
rapid, lethal, response to regional conflicts.
The real value of precision guided munitions is their
ability to bring a delicate situation under control quickly.
Moreover the mere presence of a battle group with the
demonstrated accuracy of these assets could deter a potential
aggressor. Along with fixed wing assets, improved cruise
missiles could delay or deny forward enemy movements. The
enhanced accuracy and flexibility makes it an ideal weapon to
neutralize enemy air operations and suppress enemy air
defenses
.
Naval and all other air power assets can now be used to
attack strategic targets which were once reserved for nuclear
weapons. Although precision guided munitions are not suitable
for mass population destruction, they are suitable for
striking targets critical to an enemy's military
infrastructure. Key production facilities, power production
facilities, and most importantly, leaders and key C3 assets
are all vulnerable to the new generation of weapons. .
Whether or not Congress agrees that the new capabilities
are in fact necessary or whether "better is the enemy of good
enough" is yet to be seen. One must not forget that no
advance in technology yields a permanent advantage; someone
will eventually develop an effective countermeasure.
Therefore, we must continue to develop and produce advanced
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